Strategically allocating resources to protect targets against potential threats in an efficient way is a key challenge facing our society. From the classical interdiction game to the recently proposed Stackelberg Security Game, applying computational game models to the security domain has made a real-world impact on numerous fields including military attack and defense, financial system security, political campaign and civil safeguarding. However, existing methods assume additive utility functions, which are unable to capture the inherent dependencies that exist among different targets in current complex networks.
I. INTRODUCTION
Providing security for critical infrastructure, cyber-physical networks and other financial systems is a large and growing area of concern. The key problem in many of these security domains is how to efficiently allocate limited resources to protect targets against potential threats. With the development of computational game theory over the past two decades, such resource allocation problems can be cast in the game-theoretic contexts, which provides a more sound mathematical approach to determine the optimal defense strategy. It allows the analyst to factor differential risks and values into the model, incorporate game-theoretic predictions of how the attacker would respond to the security policy, and finally determine an equilibrium strategy that cannot be exploited by adversaries to obtain a higher payoff.
One line of research initiated in the seminal paper of Wollmer (1964) is the interdiction game (IG). It is a two-player normal form game, in which both players move simultaneously. The evader attempts to traverse a path 1 Sinong Wang and Fang Liu is with graduate student of Department of Electrical and Computer Engineering, the Ohio State University, 2015 through a network from the source node to the destination node, without being detected by an interdictor, while the defender deploys the interdictor in different nodes or links to halt the possible intrusion. The IG has been successfully applied to United States' drug interdiction [18] , communication network vulnerability [3] and urban network security recently [4] .
In some security domains, the defender can build the fortifications before the attack and it is thus in the leader's position from the point view of the game and able to move first. The branch of research inspired by this phenomenon is called Stackelberg Security Games (SSG), which includes a defender and an attacker, and several targets. The defender moves first by committing to a strategy and then it is observed by the attacker, who plays a best response to the defender's strategy. The SSG is currently used by many security agencies including Federal Air Marshals Service, US Coast Guard, Transportation System Administration and even in the wildlife protection; see book by Tambe [16] for an overview.
A. Motivation
A common limitation of existing security game models is that they do not consider the dependency among the different targets. In the SSG, the payoff functions for both players are additive, i.e, the payoff of a group of targets is the sum of the payoffs of each target separately. This assumption means that the security agency measures the importance of several targets without considering the synergy effect among them. In practice, there exists some linkage structure among the targets such that attacking one target will influence the other targets. For instance, an attacker attempts to destroy the connectivity of a network and the defender aims to protect it. The strategy for both players is to choose the nodes of the network. If there are two nodes that constitute a bridge of this network, successfully attacking both of them will split the network into two parts and incur a huge damage, while attacking any one of them will have no significant effect. Hence, traditional models that ignore the inherent synergy effect between the targets are limiting and could lead to catastrophic consequences. where {v} denotes the index of the nodes. We adopt the network value proposed by [3] as the security measure for different nodes, which calculates the importance of group of nodes via subtracting the value of the network by removing these nodes from the value of the original network 1 . For example, if we adopt the network value as a 1 Compared with traditional measures such as degree and betweenness centrality, the network value provides a more accurate description of the importance of different nodes.
function f ({n i }) = i n 2 i , where n i is number of nodes in the ith component, the value of the original network is 20 2 = 400. After removing node 3, the network will be divided into two components: one 18−node network and one isolated node, the network value is reduced to 18 2 + 1 2 = 325. Thus the benefit of node 3 is equal to the decrement 400 − 325 = 75. Similarly, we can get the benefits of other nodes as illustrated in the bottom table of Fig 1. In traditional security game models, they assume that the benefit of strategy {1, 2} and {3, 4} is equal to 39 + 39 = 78 and 75 + 75 = 150. The mixed strategy equilibrium 2 under this case is that defender choose nodes 1, 2 with probability 0.34 and nodes 3, 4 with probability 0.66. Instead, if we adopt the true value of nodes {1, 2} and {3, 4} (as illustrated in red of bottom table), the equilibria is that the defender chooses nodes 1, 2 with probability 0.63 and nodes 3, 4 with probability 0.37. From the point view of the network, the second one provides a more reliable strategy.
[10] investigated the security investment in the multi-player scenario and introduced the Interdependent Security
Game (IDS). The insight in this work is that a large number of players must make individual investment decisions related to security, but in which the total utility of each participant may depend in a complex way on the actions of the entire population. Further, [6] construct a computational game model of this problem based on the linear influential network and provides a polynomial algorithm to determine the equilibrium investment strategy for each player.
B. Conceptual Contributions and Results
In this paper, we introduce a new security game, named as Non-additivity Security Game (NASG), which is a normal form non-zero-sum game including two players -the defender and attacker, and n targets. We deal with the internal linkage structure among targets via defining the strategy set of each player as a family of sets and adopt the set function as the utilities. More specifically, we use [n] = {1, 2, . . . , n} to denote all the targets and the strategy of attacker and defender is the subset of [n]. The attacker will obtain the benefits for successfully attacked targets and pay the cost for its strategy. Correspondingly, the defender will lose the benefits for those targets and also pays the cost. A critical point in the NASG is that the benefit and cost for different strategy is described by the non-additive set function defined on the power set of [n]. Namely, the utility for several targets is not the summation of each target's utility, instead, dependent on the specific combination of targets. Compared with traditional security game models, the NASG provides a refined description of the dependency among different targets. However, the following are some of key challenges in being able to determine the equilibrium strategy of the NASG.
• The NASG is a large-scale security game with both exponentially increasing number of strategies and utility functions. This is unavoidable because we need to completely describe the internal combinatorial structure of the problem. In previous security game models such as IG and SSG, the number of utility functions is linear in the number of targets and the difficulty mainly derived from the exponentially large strategy set. In NASG, exponentially growing parameters further complicate the problem, which is unavoidable when we want to describe the internal combinatorial structure of the problem.
• The NASG is the non-zero-sum game under a general utility function. In the NASG setting, we do not consider any specific form of the utility functions and define them as a system of set functions. This general assumption of utility functions not only yields an extremely large input size when combined with their huge quantity, but also makes designing an efficient algorithm more difficult.
In NASG, each player can choose any subsets of n targets, which yields N = 2 n strategies and 3N utility functions. Thus, the game size is denoted by N . For example, in the Italian communication network, the number of targets, i.e., cities, is 25, and the number of possible actions and utility functions for each player is 2 25 ≈ 10 8 , which is substantially larger than the current record for solving the large-scale game. 3 Since NASG is a non-zero-sum game, if we use the Lemke's algorithm to exactly solve it, in the worst case, the time complexity is up to O(2 N ) and can only be applied to the cases for which n < 5.
Further, by utilizing the internal specific structure of the NASG, we show that it is equivalent to a specifically constructed zero-sum game. There are two mainstreams in the current state-of-art to tackle the large-scale zero-sum game. The first technique introduced by [8] focuses on compressing the strategies based on their relationship and solving an equivalent game under the compact representation. We show that this approach can only be applied to the case when all the utility functions are additive in NASG. Another technique is first introduced by [14] to solve convex games. Then, [4] applied the oracle algorithm into the large scale urban security game and showed a significant speed up. The key in this algorithm is to design the efficient solver for attacker and defender oracle problem. Unfortunately, due to the large input size in NASG, solving such oracle problem in each iteration requires at least time of O(N ). Moreover, the oracle algorithm is a heuristic algorithm without theoretical guarantee. In the worst case, it will enumerate all the strategies, and thus is less efficient than applying any linear programing into the original problem.
The key limitation of previous algorithms is that they are only designed for an large strategy set, i.e., the oracle algorithm incrementally adds the strategy to the current strategy set and possibly terminates before enumerating all the strategies, the compact representation compresses the exponential number of strategies into the linear quantity based on their relationship. However, in the NASG, due to intrinsic linkage structure among different targets, both number of strategies and utility functions are exponentially increasing. Nonetheless, our goal for this problem is design a fast algorithm to determine the equilibrium strategy of the NASG with complexity linear in the game size N .
Such an algorithm-whose error is asymptotically close to 0 when the game size N goes to infinity-is known as being asymptotically optimal. Since the input size of the NASG is the number of benefit and cost functions, i.e, N , even loading the original data and outputting the optimal solution will incur O(N ) time. We will design a linear time algorithm by building new concepts and leveraging recent progress in several fields, including matrix decomposition, low-dimensional embedding, fast algebra transform and primal-dual iterative algorithm.
In the first part of our work, we reduce the original problem to a low-rank perturbed zero-sum game based on the decomposable property of the payoff matrix and the random low-dimensional embedding, whose payoff matrices only exhibit logarithmic rank and asymptotic zero error. This process exhibits two advantages: first, solving the zerosum game is much easier than the non-zero-sum game; second, previous work by [13] shows that the logarithmic rank of payoff matrix means that the game has a logarithmic support and we can solve this small support game much more efficiently. Further, by utilizing the structure of our decomposition, we design a nearly linear time algorithm to implement the above low-rank approximation procedure via the fast Möbius and Zeta transform.
In the second part, we incorporate our approximation framework into the Augmented Lagrangian and Coordinate Descent (AL-CD) Method to determine the equilibrium strategy, which is a kind of iterative algorithm designed for the large-scale linear programming problem. Recent progress on the analysis of this algorithm [19] shows that it only requires O((log(1/ )) 2 ) iterations to converge. The key bottleneck of the AL-CD method is the matrixvector multiplication, which requires the cost of O(N 2 ) per iteration. In our low-rank approximation framework, we decompose the original N × N payoff matrix into the summation of one symmetric matrix and two constant rank-1 matrices, where the symmetric matrix is equal to product of two N × log(N ) matrices. Thus, such matrixvector multiplication can be transformed into four much smaller multiplications and only requires the O(N log(N ))
time. Putting all these approaches together, we can get a nearly linear time algorithm to solve the NASG. The theoretical framework built in this paper provides an additional alternative for the traditional techniques of compact representation and the oracle algorithms in order to solve large-scale games.
II. PRELIMINARIES
A. Game-theoretical Modeling of NASG we begin by defining the NASG as a two-player normal-form non-zero-sum game.
Players: A non-additive security game contains a defender and an attacker, and n dependent targets, indexed by set [n]. The players need not be individuals, but could also be the organizations and groups who adopt a strategy.
The target can be quite general and dependent on the application in mind. For example, they could represent links in the communication networks, roads in urban networks and individuals in security investment.
Strategies:
The pure strategy for each player is the subset of [n]. Here we consider the complete pure strategy set, defined as Correspondingly, the mixed strategy is the probability distribution p and q over the pure strategy set A and D.
The assumption that attacker and defender can choose any group of targets to attack and defend could be true for certain military scenarios, such as missile attacks and defense. While considering other domains, there are some constraints in the strategy set for both player due to the limited resources. In the Section VI, we show that our theoretical framework can be extended to this kind of subgame and still get a nearly linear time algorithm of the number of utility functions.
Utilities: Let set function C a : A → R and C d : D → R be the attacker's and defender's cost function, and the set function B : A → R be the benefit function for each player. All of them are strictly monotonically increasing and the benefit function is strictly larger than the cost function under the same strategy. We adopt the following tie-breaking rule: when the attacker and defender choose strategy A ∈ A and D ∈ D , the attacker's and defender's utility is given by B(A\D) − C a (A) and −B(A\D) − C d (D), respectively 4 . We make the standard assumption that all utility functions lie in the range [0, 1].
Remark 1: Instead of estimating the total benefits of targets as their summation, we use the set function to describe the benefit and cost of targets. Our model is equivalent to the previous security model when we assume that the benefit function is additive and do not consider the cost for each strategy.
When the attacker and defender play the mixed strategy p ∈ P and q ∈ Q, the expected payoffs for attacker and defender are
where p(A) and q(D) is the probability that attacker and defender choose pure strategy A and D under the mixed strategy p and q, respectively. M a and M d is the payoff matrices of attacker and defender. Thus, the NASG can be described by the bimatrix game(M a , M d ), where the attacker is the row player, and the defender is the column player.
Solution concept: If both players move simultaneously, the standard solution concept is the Nash equilibrium (NE), in which no single player can obtain a higher payoff by deviating unilaterally from this strategy.
Definition 2: A pair of strategies (p * , q * ) forms a NE if they satisfy the following 1) The defender plays the best response:
2) The attacker plays the best response:
Correspondingly, the approximate equilibria means that both player cannot gain more than by a unilateral deviation, which is a relaxation of above relation via an additive error .
Based on our general assumption, NASG can be regarded as the abstract mathematical model of several security games. For example, the computational IDS model proposed by [6] is a special case of NASG, where the benefit function is defined as the linear combination of benefit of each target (called individual in IDS). The communication network security game proposed by [3] and network interdiction game [4] can be regarded as a subgame of NASG.
As shown in the sequel, NASG exhibits the property that NE set and Stackelberg Equilibrium (SSE) set are equivalent. Without considering the cost functions, NASG is also an extension from previous SSG model to the non-additive case 5 .
B. Properties of the NASG
As defined in (1) and (2), the payoff matrices M a and M d can be written as
where M is the benefit matrix that consists of all the benefit functions, C a (A) and C d (D) is the corresponding cost matrix. Note that the cost matrix C a (A) is the column matrix and C d (D) is the row matrix 6 .
Proposition 1: NASG is the bilinear game with rank 2.
The bilinear game has the fixed rank of matrix M a + M d , which is one subclass of the general non-zero-sum game. The zero-sum game can be categorized to the bilinear game of rank 0. It was first introduced by Kannan and Theobald [5] , and they also developed a fully polynomial time approximation scheme (FPTAS) for fixed rank games. Based on their technique, we can get a Θ(N 4 / 2 ) algorithm for computing the -NE of NASG.
Proposition 2: NASG is equivalent to the zero-sum game with payoff matrices
Proof: To prove the equivalence between non-zero-sum game
, we need to prove the NE set is equivalent between these two games. The proof is based on the property of cost matrix and details can be seen in the Appendix VIII-A.
This proposition allows us to solve the NASG via the equivalent zero-sum game, which can be tracked by several efficient methods.
Remark 2: In fact, the NASG belongs to the strategically zero-sum game, proposed by Moulin [15] . In this kind of game, not only is it equivalent to the zero-sum game, but the SSE 7 set and NE set are equivalent, thus the defender has no dilemma to consider how smart the attacker is and only needs to determine the NE set [9] .
We define the utility function for attacker and defender in the zero-sum game as
Proposition 3: The benefit matrix M is isomorphically symmetric.
Proof: Suppose that the order of strategy set for row player is given by index function σ(·) : A → N, we define the following index fucntion of strategy set for column player:
The first equality comes from the relation between index function σ(·) and µ(·). The rest of equalities are based on the definition of the benefit matrix.
Above definition of index function for the strategy is intuitive in that each strategy for both players exhibits the complementary relation when they are in the same location of both strategy set. For example, if n = 2, the order of strategy set for row player is σ({1, 2}) = 1, σ({2}) = 2, σ({1}) = 3 and σ({∅}) = 4, then the order for column player is µ({∅}) = 1, µ({1}) = 2, µ({2}) = 3 and µ({1, 2}) = 4. Based on Proposition 2 and Proposition 3, the payoff matrix we need to solve in the NASG can be written as the summation of one symmetric matrix M , one column matrix C a (A) and one row matrix
Notation: We adopt the above default order of strategy set in the rest of the paper. We use the 2 
the payoff matrix for equivalent zero-sum game. M is the low rank approximation matrix of benefit matrix M .
1{·} is the indictor function. B(2
[n] ) represents all the benefit function. The E N is the identity matrix,
is N −dimensional vector with all elements equal to 1 (0).
III. SPECIAL CASE
Before solving the NASG generally, we first tackle several special cases of the NASG to reveal some useful insights.
A. Saddle Point
A pair of pure strategies (A * , D * ) forming the NE is always referred as the saddle point and satisfies the following condition,
The pure strategy A for attacker can be represented as the mixed strategies e σ(A) , the unit vector with 1 in the position σ(A) and 0 elsewhere. Similarly, the pure strategy D for defender is represented by e µ(D) . Thus, if the game contains the saddle point, we can solve NASG directly by outputting it as the mixed NE strategy. The following theorem gives the negative result that NASG does not exhibit the saddle point property.
Theorem 1: The NASG contains no saddle point. From the proof of Theorem 1, we can observe that the NE strategy for attacker should be disjoint with the defender's strategy, while for the defender, it should be a subset of attacker's strategy. This result is intuitive under our tie breaking rule: the defender can defend the targets within his strategy with probability 1, thus the attacker will attempt to evade the defense while the defender aims to cover the attacked targets. In the fair setting, i.e., monotonicity of cost, both player cannot stay in the dominant position and there exists no saddle point.
B. Additive Solution
A simple case is to consider the additive benefit and cost function. In this special case, the NASG can be solved in Θ(polylog(N )) time based on the technique of compact representation proposed by [8] . This technique compresses the original 2 n variables (mixed strategy) into only n variables (marginal distribution) and solve the original large-scale game via a much smaller one.
. Then, based on the equivalent zero-sum game and max min theorem, the NASG can be formulated as the following optimization problem,
where
[n] and 1 N · q T = 1.
It can be further written as,
Utilizing the additive condition to expand each benefit and cost function, we have
The last equality derives from simple exchanging order of summation. If we define the following variables,
It is clearly the above summation is over all the pure strategies that contains the target v, andp v is the marginal probability that attacker chooses target v. Similar definition forq v . Then we can formulate the following simplified optimization problem,
Although the above model reduces the original 2 n+1 variables p, q to only 2n variablesp andq, the bottleneck in this method is how to describe the optimizing region ∆ n via a small number of constraints. In this case, the region ∆ n is a n−dimensional cube and only requires n constraints s.t. ∆ n = {p|0 ≤p v ≤ 1, ∀v ∈ [n]}. This result is not new that the previous work by [8] uses the compact representation to solve the massive SSG and the above result of ∆ n can be regarded as the combination of Theorem 1 and Theorem 2 in his work. Therefore, applying the standard linear programming approach, the NASG under additive assumption can be solved in polynomial time of n, and log-polynomial of game size N .
Using the compact representation to significantly reduce the size of strategy set is widely used in the large-scale security game. A natural question is that whether we can extend this idea to the non-additive settings. To generalize this idea, we need a higher-level idea based on isomorphism and projection of polyhedra, and we present the following result, Theorem 2: If the rank(M • ) = r, the Nash Equilibrium of NASG is equivalent to the solution of the following optimization problem,
where theΓ a N andΓ d N is the N dimensional polyhedra isomorphic to attacker and defender's mixed strategy space. The operator Π r (·) is to project the N −dimension polyhedra into the first r−coordinates. M • r is the non-zero block in the row canonical form of matrix M
• .
We first conduct the gauss elimination of the matrix M • to transform it into the row canonical form, which is equivalent to left and right multiplicand by the elementary matrix E and F . Then we have
where r is the rank of payoff matrix M • and M
• r is the non-zero block in the row canonical form of matrix M • .
If we define the invertible affine projection (12) and (13) is equivalent. Further, considering the fact that only the first r elements in vector p and q have the non-zero coefficients in the objective function, the (13) can be further reduced to
where the operator Π r (·) is to project the N −dimension polyhedra into the first r−coordinates and can be implemented by the Fourier-Motzkin elimination.
Based on the above polyhedra isophormism and projection framework, the previous compact representation is the special case where r = n (As we will show in the next section, the rank of payoff matrices M • is closely related to the non-additivity of the benefit function and the rank will be n under the additive assumption) and projectingΓ a N into the first n coordinates will yield n−dimensional hypercube. However, when there exists some non-additive benefit functions, the rank of payoff matrices will be larger than n. In this situation, several critical problems are revealed: (1) projection ofΓ a N into other coordinates will yield an extremely irregular polyhedra, which requires even more than N constraints to describe. One possible solution is to construct the −net to approximate such polyhedra, but the computational complexity is 2 O(r) ; (2) there exists some implemented problem of marginal probability in the compact represented model when we consider the resource constraint [11] . Thus, the new concepts and algorithms are required to solve the NASG.
IV. LOW-RANK PERTURBED GAME
In [13] , it has been proven that (i) when the maximum difference between two payoff matrices is bounded by , the NE under one payoff matrix is the 2 -NE under another payoff matrix; (ii) the size of the support is less than the rank of the payoff matrix. These interesting results provide a possibility to solve the original problem via the technique of low-rank approximation. Eckart-Young-Mirsky theorem shows that the low-rank approximation under
Frobenious norm has an analytic solution in terms of the singular value decomposition of the original matrix. While the −NE requires a stronger notion of matrix approximation that all the difference should be less than , which lays a challenge in the current approximation techniques.
In this section, we show that the payoff matrix M • can be approximated by a logarithmic-rank matrix and the central procedure in our theoretical framework of approximation is: first, the payoff matrix
, where two cost matrices have constant rank−1. Thus, we only need to focus on the low-rank approximation of the benefit matrix M . Then, we analytically separate the benefit matrix into the difference of two positive semidefinite (PSD) matrices and construct the /2−approximation matrix of each PSD matrix via the random low-dimensional embedding technique. Finally, utilizing the special structure of such approximation, we conduct the Möbius and zeta transform to implement it in nearly linear time.
A. Decomposition of the Benefit Matrix
To this end, we first show how to decompose the benefit matrix M into the product of one diagonal matrix, one binary matrix and its transpose. The following definition is critical in our decomposition.
Definition 3:
The common utility function is defined as
If we regard the benefit function as a measure defined on a given σ−algebra of set [n], then using the inclusionexclusion principle to expand each B(V ) in the summand, we can find that B c (A) is equivalent to measuring the benefit of intersection of targets in A. It seems like measuring the synergy effect of targets in A and we refer B c (·)
as the common utility function. We have the following relation between the common utility function and benefit function.
Lemma 1:
Proof: The proof is based on counting in another way. We first expand each B c (V ) based on the definition of common utilities. Then we count the coefficient in front of a specific benefit function B(U ), U ∈ 2 [n] and prove this coefficient is equal to 1 if and only if |U | = n. The details can be seen in the Appendix VIII-C.
From Definition 3 and Lemma 1, the benefit functions and common utility functions can be constructed by each other. In the last part of this section, we can see that the common utility function is the Mobius transform of benefit function, while the benefit function is the zeta transform of common utility function. Based on Lemma 1, we have the following decomposition in term of common utilities,
The benefit matrix M can be decomposed into the following product form,
where the D is the diagonal matrix and the elements in the main diagonal is the common utility for each strategy with 
B. Low-rank Approximation
When all the common utility functions are larger than 0, all the diagonal elements of D contains the real square root and the benefit matrix can be further decomposed into the cholesky form W W T . In this case, we present the following result. 
Since the benefit matrix M is decomposed into the product of one matrix W and its transpose, each element of M can be regarded as the inner product of two row vectors of W . Further, the matrix W and M constitutes an inner product space, if we adopt an approximation matrix exhibiting the same structure, the problem of finding a low-rank approximation matrix that has bounded maximum difference is equal to the problem of finding a lowdimensional inner product space that can preserve the distance between different points. The following lemma, known as Johnson Lindenstrauss (JL) lemma, will be our main technical tool.
Lemma 2: Let u, v be vectors in R N s.t. u , u ≤ 1. Let R be the random matrix with entries i.i.d from
Here we provide the sketch of the proof of Theorem 4, the details can be seen in Appendix VIII-E. 
where W = QD As shown in the proof of Theorem 4, the rank of perturbed matrix W RR T W T has a dependency on the error of 1/ 2 , which incurs a large k when we require a smaller . However, due to the exponential decay of the above tail inequality, we do not need such large k when the game size N is sufficiently large, i.e, N > 2 20 . In certain cases, we can also combine the JL lemma with some information about the distribution of benefit function to derive a more tight bounds [1] . Another insight is that the low-rank perturbed matrix M is the product of two N × k matrix with k N , which is critical in the design of iterative algorithm.
In practice, the benefit matrix is not always PSD and we cannot decompose it into the above cholesky-like form to obtain the approximation. A simple idea is to exploit the product form QDQ T of matrix M to write the diagonal matrix D as the difference of two positive diagonal matrix. Then, the original benefit matrix can be written as the difference of two PSD matrices and we can /2−approximate each matrix respectively. There exists one technical difficulty in this approach: separating the diagonal matrix will break the dual-like relationship between the common utility and benefit function and the row vector for each PSD matrix might have a norm larger than 1. In this case, we cannot apply the Lemma 2 to get an useful tail inequality. From the proof of Lemma 2, the above problem derives from the fact that the classic random projection technique is only for the Euclidean distance and the inner product is roughly estimated by scaling. However, we can directly estimate the tail inequality for the inner product and the following version comes from [12] . 
The Lemma 3 presents a tail inequality containing the norm of the vector, which enables us to get the following result.
Theorem 5: There exists a perturbed matrix M ∈ R N ×N such that rank( M ) = Θ(log(N )) and 
where W + = QD − . Then we can use a similar procedure as in Theorem 4 to conduct the approximation. Note that in this case we adopt the Lemma 3 as the main tool. The details are listed in Appendix VIII-F.
From the proof of Theorem 5, we can see the rank of approximation matrix is dependent on the norm of vector in matrix W + and W − . In practice, to obtain an useful threshold, we can conduct a simple scaling of the above formula and adopt the k ≥ ∆ 2 · log(N )/ 2 to get a good approximation, where ∆ is the maximum norm of row vectors in matrix W + . This result means that parameter k is still equal to the logarithmic of game size N . Besides that, it also has a dependency on the maximum norm of row vectors in matrix W + . In the Section 6, we show that it can be diminished in the large game size.
C. Fast Implementation
The key problem in the above low-rank approximation is how to efficiently construct the matrix M . It can be seen that matrix M is equal to the product of matrix W R and its transpose. Using the fastest matrix multiplication algorithm still requiresÕ(N 2 ) time. Fortunately, we do not need constructing the matrix M . As shown in the next section, the basic operation in the augmented lagarangian-coordinate descend is the matrix-vector multiplication, i.e., calculating M x. Let the dimension of matrix W R denoted by N × k, where k = Θ(log(N )) based on our approximaton. Thus we only need to find the N × k matrix W R and such a matrix-vector multiplication can be implemented by two much smaller matrix-vector multiplications 8 . The main procedure is listed in the Algorithm 1.
As shown in Equation (70), the element in the matrix W has the form B c (U ), ∀U ∈ 2 [n] . Therefore, we need to first calculate all the common utility function. The direct calculation will requiresÕ(N 1.585 ) time, while it can be achieved in timeÕ(N ) via the following fast Möbius transform [7] : Initially, for all
For 1 ≤ i ≤ n, the algorithm computes B Output: The matrix C.
. The time complexity and correctness of the above algorithm is given by the following Lemma. we find f ζ(·) is the inverse Möbius transform of f (·). Using a similar algorithm, called fast zeta transform [7] , it can be achieved in timeÕ(N ).
Initially, construct random vector r from
For 1 ≤ i ≤ n, the algorithm computes C i (U, l) for all U ∈ 2 [n] based on the following recurrence
Then, the C σ(U ),l is equal to the C (n)
. Repeat this process d times, we can construct the matrix C.
The time complexity and correctness of the above algorithm can be proved by the similar argument of Lemma 4.
Remark 3: One critical property of Algorithm 1 is that it can be modified to the parallel algorithm. In l iteration of Algorithm 1, we generate the random vector and use the zeta transform to obtain one column of matrix C. Since the above random vector is i.i.d, we can implement Algorithm 1 in Θ(log(N )) processors with each cost of only O(N ).
V. ITERATIVE ALGORITHM
In this section, we focus on how to design the fast iterative algorithm via our low-rank perturbed payoff matrix.
We utilize the augmented lagrange -coordinate descend method (AL-CD) to derive a theoretically-efficient algorithm that only requires (log(1/ )) 2 iterations withÕ(N ) costs per iteration.
A. Augmented Lagrange-Coordinate Descend Method
Based on the low-rank approximated zero-sum game and min-max Theorem, the NASG under the low-rank perturbed payoff matrix can be formulated as the linear programming problem.
Naive implementation of above model requires solving an O(N 2 ) size linear programming. Since the low-rank
, we can further utilize the auxiliary variables to represent the constraint matrix in term of N × k dimensional matrix instead of the original N × N payoff matrix.
We first formulate the following primal linear programming model,
Correspondingly, the dual linear programming model is
Let the inequality constraint matrix of the primal problem be denoted by H, and the equality constraint matrix be denoted by L. Due to our formulation, the matrix H consists of the identity matrix, zero matrix and low dimension matrix C, thus it can be efficiently tackled in any linear programming algorithm. The main obstacle is the equality constraint matrix L, which has the dimension of (N + k + 1) × (2N + k + 1). Utilizing traditional methods such as simplex and interior point method, we need to solve a linear system involving matrix L, which requires at least time ofÕ(N 2 ). However, in the AL-CD method, we only need to compute the matrix-vector product Lx. 
The dual of (34) takes the form:
It is a bound-constraint quadratic optimization problem. Given (q, x, v, λ) as the Lagrangian Multipliers of (34), the corresponding p, y, v minimizing Lagrangian is
and one can obtain (q * , x * , v * , λ * ) from (35), and find (p t+1 , y t+1 , u t+1 ) through (36 
where [u] + truncates each element of vector u to be non-negative. Then problem (35) can be formulated as
The gradient of (38) can be expressed as
and the Hessian is
where T is a diagonal matrix with
In each iteration l of RCD, it picks a coordinate j l uniformly at random and minimizes with respect to that coordinate. The minimization is operated via a single step Newton step, which first determines the Newton direction
through minimizing the quadratic second-order approximation. In this case, it has the following close-from expression.
Algorithm 2: Augmented Lagrangian Method
Update p y u based on formula (36); k=k+1 and increase parameter η t by a constant factor if necessary;
and then conduct a line search to find the smallest s ∈ {1, 2, . . .} such that
The overall complexity consists of two parts: the time complexity per iteration and the iteration complexity. The iteration complexity is based on the global linear rate of convergence, which typically relies on the strong-convexity of the objective function. However, the objective function (35) is clearly not strong convex. Fortunately, existing recent work by [17] , [19] conduct the extensive analysis and shows that we can still get a global convergence rate.
We list this results for completeness.
Theorem 6: To guarantee the solution produced by AL-CD method has the bounded error such that
Therefore, to guarantee a total complexity is O(N k(log(1/ )) 2 ), the iteration complexity per coordinate update should be O(k). We show this objective can implemented via utilizing the dynamic programming approach. The major cost in each iteration is the calculation of the j l th gradient
and the line search (44).
The naive calculation of the jth gradient and Hessian based on formula (39) and (42) will require the time of O(N k). Another clever implementation is to maintain the relation(39) and (42) as follows whenever a coordinate
where H j l and L j l is the j l th column of matrix H and L. The complexity of updating vector w 1 is at most O(k) since the inequality constraint matrix H only consists of identity matrix, zero matrix and low dimension matrix C.
While the obstacle is that the complexity of updating vector w 2 is O(N ) when the coordinate j l falls into the block
We show in the sequel this problem can be tackled by the dynamic programming.
The gradient and hessian can be calculated as
For each coordinate j l , the term H j l , [w is based on the following rule: for the first summand, we can exploit the block structure of matrix L and tackle it in the following two cases: first,
The term 
T , which consists of N + k + 1 non-zero elements and such dot product requires O(N + k + 1) time). As we discussed, the rest task is to design an efficient algorithm to update w 2 and calculate the term L j l , w t,l 2 . We show the following simple dynamic programming algorithm, which only requires O(1) time and additional O(1) space to implement.
Assuming the coordinate 1 ≤ j l ≤ N and 1 ≤ j l−1 ≤ N , then we have
The first term can be written as
The terms time. The second term can be written as
The last equality is based on the column property of cost matrix C d (D 
The case when 1 ≤ j l ≤ N and N + 1 ≤ j l−1 ≤ 2N + k + 1 can be tackled by the similar way. We can expand recursive formula (49) until the iteration l such that 1 ≤ j l ≤ N . Each additional expansion term can be calculated in O(1) time (vector L j has at most 1 non-zero term). Besides that, the complexity of line search mainly derives from the calculation of objective function, which can be tackled in O(1) time via the similar dynamic programming approach.
Based on above dynamic programming approach, the overall complexity of AL-CD method is O(N k(log(1/ )) 2 ).
Since the complexity of previous low-rank approximation is O(N k 2 ), putting these mechanisms together, the complexity of the overall procedure is O(N k
By incorporating our low-rank approximation framework, this algorithm exhibits several advantageous: 1. there exists no asymptotic ill-conditionedness phenomenon, which is a common problem in the interior point method;
2. the optimal solution under our low rank approximation matrix has logarithmic support, thus most primal (dual)
variables become binding at zero as the iterates approach the optimal solution, which potentially speed up the algorithms.
VI. SUBGAMES
In Section 2, we have mentioned that not all the targets can be attacked and defended because of the resource constraints. For example, in the classic stackelberg security game model, the defender has a limited number of resource schedules, each of which can only cover some targets [2] . In the urban network security game, the defender can deploy at most 5 check points in 190 links and attacker only choose one source-destination path. In the colonel blotto game, both player have the limited budget to distribute and at most choose a portion of n targets.
In other applications, the benefit function exhibits the bounded non-additivity. This concept is a little subtle and the rigorous definition is given in the sequel.
In this part, we model above discussed phenomenon as two kinds of restricted NASG: first, the strategy space is bounded while the benefit and cost function is arbitrary; second, the strategy space is complete while the benefit and cost function has the bounded non-additivity.
A. Bounded Strategy set
Here we only consider the case that the attacker and defender's strategy is bounded by a cardinality constraint, which means that the attacker and defender cannot choose an extremely large strategy. This assumption is realistic in most cases and corresponds to the SSAS property as discussed in [9] . As show in the sequel, this assumption can be straightforwardly extended to the arbitrary cardinality constraint, i.e., the size of strategy is fixed, larger than a threshold or bounded in an interval.
Let the attacker and defender's strategy set is denoted by
}, the number of strategies for attacker and defender is N a and N b . The benefit matrix M b under bounded strategy set is an N a × N b rectangular matrix and equivalent to a sub-matrix of M . Based on previous results, the original benefit matrix M can be written as 9 BB T . Therefore, the sub-matrix M b is equal to the product of one N a × N sub-matrix and one N × N b sub-matrix of B. In fact, due to the property of matrix B and the cardinality constraint, the dimension of above two sub-matrix can be reduced to N a × N a sub-matrix B a and
Example 3: The setup is same as Example 2, the cardinality constraint is k a = k b = 1, which means both player at most attack and defend one target. Then we can decompose the benefit matrix into the following form,
Therefore, based on Lemma 3 and above decomposition, we can get the following results,
There exists a perturbed matrix M b ∈ R Na×N b such that rank( M b ) = Θ(log(N a )) and
Further, low-rank perturbed matrix
The proof is similar to that of Theorem 5. Note that in this case, we randomly projected the N a -dimension vectors into the log(N a ) dimension. The fast implementation of above approximation is based on the partial Möbius transform, which only calculates the common utilities of available strategy. Then we can conduct the AL-CD algorithm to solve such low-rank perturbed game. The overall complexity of resulting algorithm is still linear of the game size N a and N b .
B. Bounded Non-additivity
In some applications, the benefit function only exhibits the non-additivity when the size of the strategy is less than a threshold. Considering the attack and defense of the nodes in a network, the attacker attempts to destroy the connectives of the network while the defender aims to prevent it. One intuitive metric for the benefit is the number of adjacent links of targets. It can be easily checked that the common utilities for the strategies with size larger than 2 is equal to 0. While in other cases, it exhibits the non-additivity when the size of strategy is larger than a threshold. For example, in the colonel blotto game, Roberson has proposed a kind of piece-wise successful function, in which the benefit function is linear and only when the number of attacked targets exceed a critical value, the attacker will get a bonus.
Under the second cases, the definition of bounded-additivity is trivial, i.e., B(X) = v∈X B(v) if |X| < k; B(X) = v∈X B(v), otherwise. But this definition cannot be adapted to the first case, because when the small strategy is non-additive, the large strategy containing this small strategy will not be additive. The essential point is how to make a systematic definition for both cases. For this reason, the additivity cannot be easily characterized by, for instance, the linear summation form. Instead, one is led to the conclusion that common utilities is an appropriate notion with which to describe the additivity. Thus, we have the following definition for the first case, Definition 4: The benefit has the bounded non-additivity iff there exists constant k c s.t.
The definition for the second case is similar. Let 
VII. NUMERICAL RESULTS
We first provide some simulation results of the low-rank approximation as a sanity check. The following four types of data were used in our evaluation.
• Attack defense game in the Italian communication network. The benefit function is generated based on the network value f ({n i }) = i n i log(n i ) [3] .
• Attack defense game in the Erdös-Renyi network G(n, p) with p = 0.3. The benefit function is generated via the same network value function.
• Sub-additive benefit function with formula: B(X) = v∈X B(v) · |X| κ .
• Super-additive benefit function with formula:
We ran the simulation under two cases: small game size N = 2 12 = 4096 and large game size N = 2 16 = 65536.
The parameter κ is set to 0.1 to guarantee the monotonicity of the benefit function. The rank of original matrix is equal to N . As illustrated in Fig. 2 , the results agree with our theoretical analysis well: (1) The error exhibits an exponential decay with the dimension k; (2) The approximation in the large game size performs much better than the small game size. (3) When the benefit function is all sub-additive or super-additive, a very small k (approximately 1% of the original rank) is sufficient. (4) The approximation error in the real-world trace is significantly smaller than in the random network. The reason is that the maximum norm ∆ in the random network is larger than other cases, and only can be diminished when N is large. Moreover, we compared our modified AL-CD algorithm (called as L-AL-CD) with the state-of-the-art implementation of interior point and dual simplex methods and original AL-CD algorithm. For all experiments, the stopping criterion is set to require the both primal and dual infeasibility smaller than 10 −3 and set the initial sub-problem tolerance t = 10 −2 and η t = 1. The following table has been generated using the data of Italian communication network. We observed across all experiments conducted that the proposed L-AL-CD algorithms can be orders of magnitude faster than other methods when the the game size is larger than 2 12 . In addition, due to our low-rank approximation, the L-AL-CD method requires a much smaller storage space. For example, when N = 2 16 , k = 750, the input size of L-AL-CD is only 100MB, while running traditional methods such as dual simplex, interior point and AL-CD method, is out of memory in our test platform 10 .
VIII. DISCUSSION
This paper introduced a new security game model, called Non-additive Security Game, and designed an algorithm to solve it in nearly linear time in terms of the number of utility functions. The low-rank approximation framework built in this paper provides an alternate way to design the large-scale game solver. Here we discuss about several extensions based on the insights we obtain from the NASG.
Extension to Stackelberg Security Game: In the Stackelberg Security Game, there are four kinds of utility functions, i.e., the benefit and loss function for attacker and defender. If we again consider non-additive condition for above utility functions, the structure of the payoff matrix will be changed. In this case, there exists two benefit matrices and two loss matrices, in which all the matrices are isomorphically symmetric but under different definitions of index function. Therefore, the low-rank perturbation in this case will become more complicated and one open problem is whether one can solve Non-additive Stackelberg Security Game efficiently.
Extension to Coalition Games (CG):
The coalition game consists of a finite set of n players and a characteristic function defined on the power set of n players, which describes how much collective payoff a set of players can gain by forming a coalition. One problem in CG is to determine if the core is non-empty, which is equivalent to determining the feasibility of a linear programming with 2 n + 1 constraints and n variables. It can be observed that NASG and CG shares the same assumption of the utility functions (2 n set functions). We hope that the techniques introduced in this paper, i.e., matrix decomposition and fast algebra transform, shed light on tackling large input size incurred by such set functions.
APPENDIX
From conditions (58) and (59), we can find that mixed strategies ((p * , q * )) is the NE point of zero sum game
, which implies the NE set of NASG belongs to the the NE set of this zero-sum game.
Similarly, we can obtain the other direction and Proposition follows. 
The last inequality is due to the strict monotonicity of cost function C a . The above result shows that attacker can get higher payoff via strategy A, which violates the NE condition of (A * 
which is impossible for a standard set system. Thus, theorem follows. 
= B(U ).
As seen in the Equation (62), we first traverse all the subsets of U and then for each subset V , traverse its subset W . Thus, there are multiple copies for a specific B(W ) of Equation (62). The Equation (63) 
The above coefficient is equal to 1 iff i = |U | and 0 otherwise, thus the lemma follows.
D. Proof of Theorem 3
Proof: Let's fix A ∈ A and D ∈ D, then the element (σ(A), µ(D)) of matrix QDQ T is equal to
Let vector T = Q σ(A) D, Based on the definition of matrix Q and D, the µ(U )th coordinate of vector T is
